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When G. Stanley Hall (1904) wrote the first book on adolescence at
the turn of the 20th century, he was describing a new cultural phenomenon that had emerged in the United States and other industrializing societies during the late 19th century. There had always been
children, whether or not we theorized about them, but there had not
always been adolescents.
Of course, there have always been teenagers in the mathematical
sense of persons who have reached the age of 13 years but not yet
20 years (and in the linguistic sense that these are the ‘‘teen’’ years
in our counting scheme). But in most societies and cultural traditions teenagers were not a distinguishable group. Depending on gender they might be expected to work, marry, have children, or run a
household. The Jewish Bar Mitzvah at age 13, for example, has for
centuries marked entry into the adult community with full rights
and responsibilities. Romeo’s Juliet was just 13 years old. Teens were
young adults for most of history; there was no special category of
teenagers or adolescents.
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Now that adolescents have been around for more than a century,
however, we think they have been here forever. In fact, we theorize

about them as if adolescence were a natural biological phenomenon associated with the teen years, and as if the psychological phenomena of adolescence were the predictable result of teen brains.
Our thinking about adolescents, I suggest, is deeply flawed. In this guest
editorial, expanding on previous publications (Moshman, 2011a, 2011b,
2011c), I identify five fallacies.

Categorical misclassification
Teenagers (ages 13–19) are categorically different from young children but
not from older individuals. Teens routinely show forms and levels of knowledge and reasoning rarely or never seen before the age of 10 or 11. Like
adults, but unlike children, those we call ‘‘adolescents’’ often engage in hypothetico-deductive reasoning, dialectical reasoning, and reflective coordinations of theories and evidence. They show explicit conceptions of inferential validity and reflective epistemologies. In social and moral contexts they
apply third-party perspective taking and principled reasoning. Many construct personal identities (Moshman, 2011a; see also Kuhn, 2009).
There is no comparable list, to my knowledge, of abilities common among
older individuals but rare in young teens. Anything most adults can do, most
teens can do too. Development beyond the age of about 12 is far too subtle
and individualized to divide people into categories on the basis of age.
It is thus a misclassification to categorize adolescents with children (as
‘‘minors’’ or ‘‘mere children’’). There is, moreover, no reason to see them as
constituting a distinct category between children and adults. There is simply
no empirical basis for categorically distinguishing adolescents from adults.

Alleged irrationalities
Regardless of the evidence for adolescent competence, allegations of adolescent irrationality never end. In the latter third of the 20th century, a favored concept was ‘‘adolescent egocentrism,’’ which was taken to include
uniquely adolescent tendencies to construct a ‘‘personal fable’’ of oneself
and assume an ‘‘imaginary audience’’ especially concerned with that self.
For decades after Elkind’s (1967) theoretical analysis of egocentrism in relation to Piaget’s stage of formal operations, it was popular to talk of ‘‘adolescent egocentrism’’ as if there were some special kind or extent of egocentrism associated with adolescence. Substantial research, however, has
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failed to show the age trends predicted by Elkind’s theoretical claims (Millstein & Halpern-Felsher, 2002; Quadrel, Fischhoff,&Davis, 1993; Smetana &
Villalobos, 2009). We are all egocentric in various ways and to various degrees. The egocentrism of adolescents is nothing special.
Today the latest concern is ‘‘adolescent risk taking,’’ which is taken to
be a bad thing special to adolescents. It is often rational to take risks, however, and adolescence is a period of life when this is surely so. Do adolescents have a special propensity, rarely seen in children or adults, to take irrational risks? On the contrary, adolescents take the same sorts of risks as
adults and show the same rational and irrational tendencies common to human functioning. There is no empirical basis for distinguishing adolescents
from adults with respect to risk taking.
Of course many adolescents repeatedly engage in behaviors (often involving drugs or sex) that many adults find objectionable, but many adults also
engage in the same behaviors. There is no standard of rational risk taking
that is generally met by adults but rarely by adolescents (Moshman, 2011a).
Beyond about age 12, individual differences in how open we are to taking
risks and how rational we are in assessing risk have little or no relation to
age. Other factors such as poverty may be more strongly related to the propensity to take risks and the types of risks taken (Males, 2009, 2010a).
Are adolescents irrational? The evidence is clear that they often fall short
of logical and other standards of rationality and that they are highly subject to emotional biases, cognitive distortions, self-serving denial, and peer
pressure. But, adults are irrational in all the same ways and, on average, to
about the same extent. Beyond about age 12, age does not predict rationality.

False charges of immaturity
Children of any age up to 12 are demonstrably more mature than children
three years younger than themselves. The literature of developmental psychology provides many examples of competencies routinely seen among,
say, 6-year-olds that are rare among 3-year-olds. And, even 9-year-olds are
lacking a variety of competencies most of them will show by the age of
12. But, there is no evidence of any form or level of competence common
among adults beyond some age but rare in young teens. Quite the contrary,
on any measure of competence, rationality, or psychological functioning,
many 14-yearolds perform beyond the level of many 40-year-olds (Moshman, 2011a).
In recent years, terms such as ‘‘executive function’’ and ‘‘executive control’’ have been used to refer to higherorder forms of information processing involving metacognitive self-regulation. But children, it is important
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to emphasize, show executive function and control from early ages. Young
teens have attained levels not seen in early childhood but individual differences beyond early adolescence show little or no relation to age. There is no
adult level of executive function or control that adolescents have yet to attain (Spear, 2010).
This is not to say there is no development beyond age 12. Quite the contrary, developmental progress in reasoning, rationality, morality, and identity
over the teen years and beyond is common (Moshman, 2011a). But, development beyond age 12 is highly individualized. Adolescents develop to varying
degrees in diverse domains and cultural contexts. Individual differences beyond age 12 are substantial, but age accounts for very little of the variance.

Reductionism
Brain science has become increasingly popular since the 1990s, and this is
especially true of research on adolescent brains (e.g., Casey, Getz, & Galvan,
2008; Spear, 2010). The potential value of such research is obvious. But interpretations of results, especially in the popular press, have tended to reduce psychology to neurobiology. The brain is presented as if it causes (and
thus explains) behavior. We are, in the reductionist view, our brains.
However, we are more than our brains, and what we do is not simply done
by our brains. We are complex, self-regulating organisms interacting

with other such organisms in complex and changing environments.
More generally, wholes are greater than the sums of their parts. Brains
are more than neurons or genes and people are more than brains.
Reductionism is arguably a fallacy in principle (Gottlieb, Wahlsten, & Lickliter, 2006; Hood, Halpern, Greenberg, & Lerner, 2010;
Overton, 2006, 2010). As we move from physics to chemistry to biology to psychology to sociology, new phenomena emerge that require
new forms of explanation. Combinations of atoms generate chemical
phenomena that are consistent with the laws of physics but cannot
be fully explained by the physics of atoms. As the chemistry of carbon moves into the realm of biochemistry it yields phenomena of life
that, without defying the laws of chemistry, sufficiently transcend
them to require new, biological forms of explanation. The behavior of
organisms, in turn, is entirely biological, but requires psychological
explanation in terms of individual agency and information processing. Psychological phenomena cannot be reduced to the anatomy and
physiology of brains.
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Even if reduction were possible in principle, moreover, we are a
long way from achieving it in fact. The behavior of diverse organisms
in diverse environmental contexts cannot be predicted accurately from
knowledge of biology and context. The potential interactions of various biological and contextual factors are far beyond our knowledge
and likely beyond human comprehension. In particular, we know far
too little about the relation of brain to behavior to explain the latter
by the former.
One especially disturbing recent trend is the tendency to reduce sociology directly to neurobiology, bypassing psychology entirely. Brain
explanations of risk taking fall in this category in that they seek a biological explanation for a vaguely conceptualized social phenomenon
that has little psychological reality. At the psychological level, as we
have seen, there is no such thing as ‘‘adolescent risk taking’’ except in
the trivial sense that adolescents, like children and adults, take a variety of risks, sometimes wisely and sometimes not. However, regardless of the psychological evidence, adolescent risk taking is seen as a
social and cultural problem that needs to be addressed. If we cannot
find anything uniquely wrong in adolescent minds, we look to their
brains.

Determinism
Determinism, which is closely related to reductionism, explains the
current state of a developing or developed organism as caused by
genes, culture, or some other specific factor, thus either denying the
developmental process or attributing development to the direct causal
effect of that factor. Forces beyond our control change our brains, a
determinist would argue, and thus change us. We become whatever
our brains become when they get changed.
Determinism is rejected by most developmentalists (Hood et al.,
2010; Overton, 2006, 2010; Paus, 2009), especially proponents of
constructivism (Mu¨ ller, Carpendale, & Smith, 2009), dynamic systems (Witherington, 2007, 2011), and relational developmental systems (Gottlieb et al., 2006; Lerner, 2006; Overton, 2010). In particular, extensive research has disconfirmed deterministic views in which
genes cause brain maturation which, in turn, causes the emergence of
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new cognitive abilities or levels of functioning. In general, it is equally
plausible that adolescent activities and experiences cause cognitive
progress which, in turn, causes positive changes in the structure and
functioning of the brain (Paus, 2009).
We need not ask, however, whether brain changes are caused by
genes, environments, or mental actions. To concern ourselves with
what causes what, in what order, would invoke the physical causality of billiard balls. The developmental causality of biological organisms has been variously described as bidirectional, relational, reciprocal, circular, co-active, and pluralistic. The brain is part of a larger
self-regulating biological system that in turn plays an active role in
a social and physical environment. We transform our brains and our
environments even as they transform us. Development cannot be understood as a simple succession of causes and effects.
Determinism is seen by many as scientific in its reductionism. Reductionist explanations, however, rely on simple forms of causality
that cannot explain developing biological and psychological structures
and processes (Witherington, 2011). The adolescent brain has great
potential, but it cannot depend on genes to generate development.

Conclusion
The evidence to support a view of adolescents as young adults is substantial. Conceptualizations of adolescents that highlight their rational agency and competence come from many quarters (Barber, 2009;
Benson, 2008; Daiute, 2010; Damon, 2008; Epstein, 2010; Hammack,
2011; Hine, 1999; Kuhn, 2009; Lerner, 2004, 2007; Levesque, 2000,
2007; Males, 2009, 2010a, 2010b; Macleod, 2011; Millstein & Halpern-Felsher, 2002; Moshman, 1993, 2009, 2011a, 2011b; Nichols &
Good, 2004; Quadrel et al., 1993; Sercombe, 2010; Sherrod, TorneyPurta, & Flanagan, 2010; Smetana, 2011; Smetana & Villalobos, 2009;
Umeh, 2009).
To see adolescents instead as irrational brains on the road to rational maturity is to succumb to all the fallacies discussed previously.
Adolescents are rational agents interacting with each other and with
their environments and constructing their own futures. They cannot
do this without their brains, but they are constructing their brains,
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not simply being driven by them. Adolescents may indeed develop,
but their development is not caused by their brains. Adolescents may
become more rational, but there is no universal or biological state of
maturity waiting to be reached.
Adolescents are, in other words, young adults. They may have
greater developmental potential than older adults, but the possibility
of developmental change does not end with adolescence and does not
make adolescents children. Adolescents, like adults but unlike children, may or may not develop, depending in part on their circumstances. The challenge for research is to understand what potentially
develops beyond childhood and how. The challenge for practice is to
promote such development where we can.
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